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DEFINING PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN AMERICA’S NEW 
ECONOMIC REALITY: THE CASE FOR THE PRIMACY OF 
FEDERAL LAW IN TAKINGS LITIGATION 
Laura E. Allen* 
ABSTRACT 
In federal takings litigation, the threshold question of whether a 
property interest exists is an unresolved matter and the source of a recent 
split in the circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit has recently shown a 
willingness to circumvent constitutional protections for private property 
owners by defining the property interest at issue in terms of state law. This 
Note argues that, on the basis of both precedent and economic policy, the 
Supreme Court should follow the First Circuit’s approach to takings 
litigation and hold that state or local regulations that interfere with property 
rights should be at least minimally restrained by the application of a 
definition of private property that is rooted in federal law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The language of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause requires 
claimants to satisfy four elements: that (1) private property (2) was 
subjected to a physical or regulatory taking by a governmental authority 
(3) for a public use and (4) without the requisite payment of just 
compensation.1 Professors David A. Dana and Thomas W. Merrill have 
suggested that “[a]lthough the question does not arise that often, the 
meaning of private property is arguably the most important determinant of 
the scope of the Takings Clause.”2 In regulatory taking adjudications, the 
threshold question of whether a property interest exists in the first place has 
generated the recent emergence of a circuit split between the First and 
Ninth Circuits. 
The nature of this split is how the property interest claimed in takings 
litigation is defined. In the analysis followed by the First Circuit, federal 
law is applied to determine both the precise property interest at stake and 
whether an unconstitutional taking of that property has occurred.3 
Conversely, in the Ninth Circuit, state law controls with respect to the 
property interest, while federal law is applied to determine the 
constitutionality of the alleged taking.4 The establishment of a circuit split 
on this issue suggests that uncertainty in the federal courts will become 
increasingly pronounced as future Takings Clause cases are litigated. Even 
though the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari with respect to the 
Ninth Circuit case that generated this problematic split,5 the need for the 
Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue is predicated upon the 
constitutional right to just compensation afforded to all private property 
owners where governmental action effectuates a taking, and the untenable 
possibility of having different results in similar Takings Clause cases across 
different courts within the same federal system. 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 58 (2002). 
2 Id. at 60. 
3 See Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990). 
4 See Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011). 
5 Id. 
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This Note explains why the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit 
split in favor of the First Circuit’s approach and enact a federal definition of 
private property that is consistently applied in takings litigation. Part II of 
this Note provides general background information with respect to the 
Takings Clause and, of particular relevance here, regulatory takings. Part III 
discusses specifics of the current circuit split and the differences in the 
analytical approaches used by the circuit courts from which the split 
derived. Part IV describes the Supreme Court precedent relied upon by the 
circuit courts with respect to this issue and explains that basing the private 
property interest on federal law is justified by Supreme Court cases that 
have generally recognized the primacy of federal law in maintaining 
property rights where state law would otherwise impermissibly minimize or 
fully abrogate those rights. Part V applies an extrinsic economic policy 
argument to the circuit split, advocating greater skepticism of regulatory 
action in light of the current economic crisis, and favoring the application 
of federal law because of its beneficial effect on individual property owners 
and the economic interests of society as a whole. Finally, Part VI provides 
insight into what a federal definition of private property might look like and 
its likely effect on takings jurisprudence. 
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES IMPLICATED IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The possession of private property is a concept that is fundamental and 
deeply embedded in the American legal tradition. The idea of individual 
property ownership emanates from the English common law, as educed by 
William Blackstone, who described property ownership as an absolute and 
inherent right of every Englishman.6 In accordance with this common law 
notion, the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the 
sanctity of property ownership through the Takings Clause, which, among 
other limitations on the use of governmental authority, states, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”7 Even 
though this provision of the Constitution was originally intended to have 
“narrow legal consequences” in applying only to the federal government’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship 
Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 274 (1988). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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acquisition of physical property, it was simultaneously intended to carry 
“broad moral implications as a statement of national commitment to the 
preservation of property rights.”8 
Takings jurisprudence today reflects a much broader application of the 
Takings Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that the Constitution’s 
just compensation requirement applies not only to the federal government, 
but to state governments as well, in accordance with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.9 Moreover, the Takings Clause no longer applies exclusively 
to the government’s acquisition of physical property through the exercise of 
eminent domain, but also to situations in which government regulation of 
property negatively impacts its value. 
The Supreme Court first expanded the scope of the Takings Clause in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,10 where the Court held that “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”11 In essence, the Court recognized that a 
state’s exercise of its police power could result in regulations that had “an 
impact functionally equivalent to an exercise of eminent domain.”12 
The Court’s holding in Mahon was of broad significance in that it gave 
rise to an expanded reading of the Takings Clause in order to limit the 
government’s ability to interfere with property rights.13 From Mahon 
emerged the “regulatory takings” doctrine, where “[i]f an exercise of the 
police power ‘goes too far’ in interfering with property rights, it will be 
invalidated unless the government pays just compensation.”14 In takings 
situations where the government “affirmatively exercises its eminent 
domain power, there usually is no issue whether the thing to be taken 
qualifies as property.”15 The inquiry becomes more complicated in 
regulatory takings cases, however, where “the foundational issue 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708 (1985). 
9 See, e.g., Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238–39 (1897). 
10 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
11 Id. at 45. 
12 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 4. 
13 See id. at 5. 
14 Id. 
15 Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Regulatory Takings Law: What Counts as 
“Property?”, 34 ZONING & PLANNING LAW REPORT, No. 9, 1 (2011). 
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considered by the courts is whether the right allegedly taken is ‘property’ at 
all.”16 
III. THE NATURE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In analyzing the existence of private property in a takings claim, the 
First Circuit uses a single step that applies exclusively federal law in 
determining both the scope of the property interest claimed and the 
constitutionality of the alleged taking. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit utilizes 
a two-step analysis that applies state law to discern the scope of the 
property interest claimed before applying federal law to determine the 
constitutionality of the alleged taking.17 In effect, this circuit split has the 
potential to be detrimental to property owners because the forum in which 
future Takings Clause cases are litigated may be a significant determinant 
in whether a court establishes that an alleged property interest exists in the 
first place, and thus, whether the claimant is entitled to just compensation 
where a taking of that property interest has occurred.  
A. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Vandevere v. Lloyd18 is the 
source of the circuit split. In that case, a group of commercial fishers in 
Alaska challenged new regulations promulgated by the state’s Board of 
Fisheries, to which the state legislature had delegated the power to “regulate 
‘commercial . . . fishing as needed for the conservation, development, and 
utilization of fisheries.’”19 The basis for the enactment of the regulations at 
issue was a provision of the Alaska constitution that allowed limitations on 
entry into state fisheries “for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent 
economic distress among fishermen . . . and to promote the efficient 
development of aquaculture in the [s]tate.”20 The effect of regulation was to 
institute various restrictions on commercial salmon fishing that were 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Id. 
17 Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 957. 
18 Id. at 957. 
19 Id. at 960 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.251(a)(12) (2006)). 
20 Id. at 959–60 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 15). 
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gradually implemented over a six-year period between 1996 and 2002 in 
various parts of Alaska’s coastal waters.21 The plaintiffs filed a claim in the 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska following the 
enactment of the 2002 regulations, alleging, inter alia, that the Takings 
Clause of the federal Constitution required the state of Alaska “to provide 
just compensation equal to the amount by which the Board’s recent 
regulations . . . reduced the value of their permits” to fish in regulated 
areas.22 
The Ninth Circuit evaluated the plaintiffs’ takings claim using the 
aforementioned two-part inquiry. The court explained that the threshold 
question was whether the plaintiffs had a property interest in their entry 
permits, which was determined to be a matter of state law.23 The court 
relied on Supreme Court dictum that property interests are not created by 
the Constitution, but instead, are “‘created and their dimensions are defined 
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law.’”24 The second part of the court’s inquiry was “whether a 
property right has been abridged improperly,” that is, “taken without just 
compensation.”25 Unlike the first part of its inquiry, the court explained that 
this question was strictly a matter of federal law, to which the court owed 
“no deference to state courts.”26 
In keeping with the deference owed to state courts under the first part 
of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that because the Alaska 
Supreme Court had previously ruled that entry permits issued to 
commercial fishers did not constitute property under takings analysis, it 
must defer to the meaning of the state law and likewise declare that the 
permits in question in the instant case did not constitute compensable 
property interests.27 Accordingly, the court declared that it did not need to 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Id. at 962. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 963. 
24 Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 964. 
27 Id. at 966–67. The relevant case was Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008), wherein the 
Alaska Supreme Court relied upon the statutory language of the state’s commercial fisheries regulatory 
scheme to hold that entry permits “[were] not property interests for purposes of takings analysis under 
the Federal or Alaska Constitutions.” Id. at 285. In particular, the Alaska Supreme Court noted the 
language of the relevant state statute, under which entry permits were conceptualized not as property but 
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complete a full takings analysis,28 and the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the state’s Commissioner of Fisheries was 
ultimately affirmed.29 
B. The First Circuit 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the fact that its takings 
analysis in Vandevere departed from the approach utilized by the First 
Circuit over twenty years earlier. As described by the Ninth Circuit, in a 
prior takings case, the First Circuit had “essentially collapse[d] the two-step 
process” utilized in Vandevere “into a single step, in which the federal 
courts, guided by their own precedents, decide both the extent of a person’s 
property interest and the question whether the state sufficiently has invaded 
that interest such that it owes just compensation.”30 In the First Circuit case, 
Hoffman v. City of Warwick,31 veterans employed by the cities of East 
Providence and Warwick, Rhode Island brought class action lawsuits 
against both their employers and state and city officials, alleging that the 
defendants’ “failure to properly administer a Rhode Island statute, 
providing for seniority credits for certain veterans, and the retroactive 
repeal of that statute, violated plaintiffs’ rights under the federal 
Constitution.”32 
In its analysis of the Rhode Island legislature’s repeal of the statute 
under which “enhanced seniority in employment” for war veterans was 
established, the First Circuit made clear, contrary to the Ninth Circuit, that 
state law is irrelevant to claims made pursuant to the Takings Clause. The 
defendants asserted that “any property interest in enhanced seniority [arose] 
from state law,”33 and that the plaintiffs were foreclosed from asserting 
ownership of a property interest. The defendants relied on a prior case 
wherein the Rhode Island Supreme Court had ruled that the enhanced 
                                                                                                                           
 
as use privileges, the modification or revocation of which did not require the payment of compensation. 
Id. at 288–89. 
28 Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967. 
29 Id. at 969. 
30 Id. at 966 (emphasis in original). 
31 Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990). 
32 Id. at 610. 
33 Id. at 615. 
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seniority credits at issue did not constitute property interests, but instead 
“merely created ‘gratuities or floating expectancies,’ until the benefits that 
would flow from enhanced seniority [were] actually received by 
employees.”34 
The First Circuit explicitly rejected this assertion, stating that the 
defendants “misconstrue[d] the role of state law in determining the scope of 
protection afforded to property rights under the federal Constitution.”35 The 
court continued, 
[t]hat the property interest allegedly protected by the federal Due Process and 
Takings Clauses arises from state law does not mean that the state has the final 
say as to whether that interest is a property right for federal constitutional 
purposes. Rather, federal constitutional law determines whether the interest 
created by the state rises to the level of “property,” entitled to the various 
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.36 
Although similar to the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere, the First Circuit 
ultimately held for the defendants. The court’s denial of just compensation 
under the Takings Clause was based not upon the state law of Rhode Island, 
but rather, upon its own analysis of the property interest claimed by the 
plaintiff veterans.37 Essentially, the First Circuit held that because the rights 
granted in the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution ultimately 
protect property interests, Takings Clause claims fall solely under the 
jurisdiction of federal law. Accordingly, state law determinations as to 
alleged property interests were flatly disregarded. 
IV. RELEVANT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
This fundamental split in evaluating Takings Clause claims introduces 
into federal appellate court case law an academic debate that has been 
developing since the early 1970s. While federal law has not always required 
that claimants seeking just compensation under the Takings Clause 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 Id. at 613–14 (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 641 (R.I. 1987)). 
35 Id. at 615. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 616–18. The court’s denial of a compensable takings claim was rooted in the lack of “a 
contractual right to enhanced seniority” for prospective seniority claims and in the absence of factors of 
“particular significance” for Takings Clause challenges, as determined by relevant Supreme Court case 
law. Id. 
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establish the existence of a private property interest, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Board of Regents v. Roth38 instituted this requirement.39 In that 
case, the Court evaluated, inter alia, whether a non-tenured professor at a 
university had a property interest in continued employment that was 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process 
requirement. In holding that there was no due process violation, the Court 
focused on the fact that the plaintiff-respondent had no discernible property 
interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment could apply, stating that “the 
terms of the respondent’s appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-
employment for the next year.”40 Significantly, no “state statute or 
University rule or policy” either guaranteed reemployment or “created any 
legitimate claim to it.”41 
A. The Source of Ambiguity 
While subsequent cases have relied on Roth for the proposition that 
takings claimants must, as an initial matter, establish that they have a 
“cognizable interest in property,”42 legal scholars have pointed to dictum in 
that case as creating ambiguity in how such cognizable interests should be 
determined. The relevant passage, also quoted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Vandevere, states that 
[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they 
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.43 
As Professors Dana and Merrill have explained, the passage is vague in that 
it could mean two different things, and it is that very ambiguity that 
underlies the current circuit split. First, the passage could be interpreted as 
endorsing the application of positive law, “‘meaning, in this context, 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
39 Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 887–88 
(2000). 
40 Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. 
41 Id. 
42 Merrill, supra note 39, at 888. 
43 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
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nonconstitutional law’ to determine both the definition of private property 
and whether any private property, as defined, has been created.”44 This is 
the approach embodied by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vandevere. 
Conversely, the Supreme Court’s dictum “could mean that courts must 
adopt a federal constitutional definition of private property, and then, armed 
with this definition, look to [the nonconstitutional] law to determine 
whether any private property, as defined, has been created.”45 This is the 
approach that was favored by the First Circuit in Hoffman. 
B. Case Law Invalidating the Application of State Law and the Argument in 
Favor of Federal Law 
While acknowledging the tension between its own analysis and that 
employed by the First Circuit in Hoffman,46 the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere 
supported its two-step approach through reliance on Supreme Court case 
law that followed the same methodology. Specifically, the court’s decision 
referenced Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council47 and Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Division v. Craft.48 Even though legal scholars acknowledge 
that the dictum in Roth could be interpreted as lending support to the 
decisions of either the First or Ninth Circuits, the existence of Supreme 
Court decisions post-dating Roth suggest that reliance on state law to 
establish the existence of a property interest is perhaps incorrect, thereby 
cutting against the Ninth Circuit’s Vandevere approach. 
Professors Dana and Merrill point to two cases in particular, Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis49 and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,50 
as being inconsistent with Ninth Circuit’s reliance on state law to define the 
property interest at issue.51 In DeBenedictis, Pennsylvania coal companies 
brought a claim against the head of the state’s Department of 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 62–63. 
45 Id. at 63. 
46 Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 965 (“We recognize the tension between our analysis . . . and the First 
Circuit’s Takings Clause analysis in Hoffman v. City of Warwick . . . but we continue to think that [the 
two-step analysis] embodies the better view.”). 
47 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
48 436 U.S. 1 (1978). 
49 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
50 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
51 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
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Environmental Resources, alleging that the state’s Subsidence Act 
“constitute[d] a taking of their private property without compensation in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”52 The statute in 
question proscribed mining activities in areas that caused damage to public 
buildings, homes, or cemeteries.53 Even though Pennsylvania property law 
uniquely recognized three separate interests in a parcel of land—the mineral 
estate, the surface estate, and the support estate54—the Supreme Court 
declined to acknowledge the support estate as a distinct segment of 
property, and instead viewed the three estates in land as a single property 
interest, in direct contradiction of Pennsylvania law. In declining to 
consider of the existence of an interest in the support estate, as established 
by state law, the Court denied the coal companies’ takings claim with 
respect to that estate.55 
Similarly, in Palazzolo, a landowner brought a takings claim against 
the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (Council) for 
promulgating regulations that limited development in areas designated as 
wetlands.56 The Supreme Court invalidated a ruling by the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court that barred the landowner’s takings claim because he had 
acquired title to the property at issue after the effective date of the 
regulations.57 The Supreme Court suggested that the promulgation of 
regulatory measures may not eliminate a property owner’s right to assert a 
takings claim, explaining that 
[w]ere we to accept the [s]tate’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would 
absolve the [s]tate of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no 
matter how extreme or unreasonable. A [s]tate would be allowed, in effect, to 
put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.58 
As Professors Dana and Merrill speculated, the Supreme Court’s blatant 
rejection of a state’s ability to proscribe an otherwise actionable takings 
claim based upon the enactment of regulatory measures “presupposes that 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 478–79. 
53 Id. at 476. 
54 Id. at 478. 
55 Id. at 501–02. 
56 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611. 
57 Id. at 632. 
58 Id. at 627. 
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property has some meaning independent of the collection of rules under 
state law about how resources may be used.”59 
While far from clarifying the ambiguous dictum found in Roth, taken 
together, DeBenedictis and Palazzolo strongly suggest that what constitutes 
a property interest need not be defined solely by state law. To be sure, in 
these two cases, the Supreme Court went so far as to invalidate state law 
conceptualizations of the property interests at issue. Since DeBenedictis and 
Palazzolo, like Lucas and Craft, post-date Roth, there is a strong argument 
that, in terms of following relevant Supreme Court case law, the Ninth 
Circuit’s exclusive focus on the law of Alaska concerning the property 
interest at issue in Vandevere was imprudent. 
It terms of the precedential value of Supreme Court decisions, it is 
unsettling that the Ninth Circuit went so far as to state that, in contrast with 
the First Circuit’s decision in Hoffman, its own analytical rule “more 
faithfully adhere[d] to the Supreme Court’s case law.”60 DeBenedictis and 
Palazzolo demonstrate that the Supreme Court does not unequivocally defer 
to state law on the question of whether a property interest exists for the 
purpose of making a Takings Clause claim. The appellate court’s decision 
would be more convincing in terms of its analytical method had it 
addressed the qualifying effect that other cases have had on its 
interpretation of Roth. Instead, one is left to speculate about how a more 
deliberative analysis of the relevant case law may have affected the 
outcome in Vandevere. 
This is not to say that the First Circuit’s approach in Hoffman is 
superior simply because of the Ninth Circuit’s failure to take a more 
comprehensive view. The strength of the First Circuit’s approach lies in its 
more nuanced inquiry into the relevant decisions of the high court, 
examining the purpose behind the analysis applied in each case. Unlike 
Vandevere, Hoffman did not rely on certain Supreme Court cases for the 
mere purpose of presenting high court cases that likewise used a one-step 
analytical model. Instead, the First Circuit analyzed Supreme Court 
precedent to discern the Takings Clause’s protective quality with respect to 
private property. 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
60 Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966. 
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The Hoffman court, like the court in Vandevere, used both Webb’s 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith61 and Craft in its analysis, yet the 
First Circuit delved deeper into the case law by examining not the analytical 
approach used by the high court in each case, but instead, the ultimate 
result. In the First Circuit’s estimation, the results reached by the Supreme 
Court in prior takings litigation endorsed the notion that federal 
constitutional law must ultimately guide the property interest element of the 
claim, since the right to the protection of that interest is rooted in the 
Constitution’s Due Process and Takings Clause provisions.62 For instance, 
the First Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s finding in Webb’s Pharmacies 
that “a [s]tate, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public 
property without compensation.”63 Thus, in line with the Supreme Court’s 
conceptualization of the Takings Clause as “a shield against the arbitrary 
use of governmental power,”64 Hoffman drew upon Webb’s Pharmacies for 
a more protective stance toward private property. According to the First 
Circuit, even when a court’s takings analysis looks to state law to inform 
the nature of the property interest at issue, federal law will intercede where 
the state law unfairly places governmental burdens on certain classes of 
property owners, since the Fifth Amendment was specifically designed to 
yield such a result.65 
Moreover, the First Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s proposition, laid 
out in Craft, that federal constitutional protections are virtually meaningless 
where state law places so little emphasis on protecting property from 
governmental intrusion that it effectively precludes application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “procedural constraints” on such intrusions.66 The 
Hoffman court’s application of federal law in place of that pronounced by 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court with respect to the scope of protection 
afforded to the property interest at issue was remarkably anticipatory. 
Indeed, the First Circuit seemed to share the same aforementioned concern, 
expressed by the Supreme Court eleven years later in Palazzolo, that a 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
62 See Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 615. 
63 Id. (quoting Webb’s Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164). 
64 Webb’s Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164. 
65 See Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 615. 
66 See id. (citing Craft, 436 U.S. at 9). 
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state’s law regarding property interests could extend such a limited a scope 
of protection that “a [s]tate would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration 
date on the Takings Clause.”67 
The fact that Supreme Court’s case law is unclear in this area, to the 
extent that it has been interpreted by the appellate courts to yield two 
different analytical models for takings litigation in the federal system, is 
problematic, and ultimately, must be resolved by the Supreme Court 
through the establishment of a clear rule. Even though property law is, 
admittedly, generally a matter of state law,68 the First Circuit’s reliance on 
federal constitutional law to determine the existence of a property interest 
in a Takings Clause claim seems the better approach in that it gives 
weighted consideration to the constitutional provisions that underlie the 
existence of the claim in the first place. To hold that state law should 
always control could allow for results that are not in keeping with the 
protections afforded property owners by the Constitution. 
V. ECONOMIC POLICY RATIONALE 
In addition to finding support in Supreme Court case law, there is a 
broader policy argument to be made for the proposition that the First 
Circuit’s focus on federal law provides a better model for analysis. While 
the issue concerning whether the property the government acquires through 
regulation constitutes private property is “the least litigated of the four 
doctrinal requirements that flow from the language of the Takings 
Clause,”69 the timing of the Ninth Circuit’s Vandevere decision makes the 
court’s permissive view towards regulatory takings particularly unsettling. 
When property interests are defined with deference to state or local laws 
that deny their very existence, the necessary consequence is the inability of 
claimants to receive the compensation necessary to offset the loss they have 
suffered. That result has the potential to severely affect the economic well-
being of those negatively impacted by state or local regulation. In the midst 
of what is widely considered the most severe economic downturn since the 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 533 U.S. at 627. 
68 Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
69 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 59. 
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Great Depression,70 the current state of the economy compels consideration 
of the practical consequences emanating from this issue. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the fact that government 
regulation of private property can be tremendously detrimental to the 
economic viability of individual property owners. For instance, in Lucas, 
the plaintiff filed a takings claim after the passage of a state law that sought 
to mitigate erosion by prohibiting the construction of “permanent habitable 
structures” on certain beachfront properties in South Carolina.71 The 
severely negative effect that this newly-enacted law would have upon the 
plaintiff, who had purchased the property to construct single-family 
homes,72 was obvious—the fact that the law prompting the lawsuit provided 
no exceptions meant that he stood to lose the nearly one million dollar sum 
that he had paid for the two parcels of land at issue.73 The Court, in 
requiring that compensation be paid, explained that, “when the owner of 
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial 
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property 
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”74 Lucas thus stands for the 
idea that even where “weighty” public interests are served through the 
enactment of regulatory takings schemes by local or state governments, the 
courts play a vital role in protecting against the economic hardship imposed 
by such laws.75 
Since Lucas was decided in 1992, some courts, including the Ninth 
Circuit, have relied on the malleability of regulatory takings law to give a 
less protective gloss to the Court’s holding in that case.76 The soundness of 
any court’s decision, however, must be measured against the backdrop of 
the socioeconomic context in which the decision was made. In the face of 
America’s new and difficult economic reality, the better approach in 
litigating takings claims is to avoid utilization of “logical tricks to avoid 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Crisis and the Public-Private Divide in Property, 
in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 65, 65 (Robin Paul Malloy & Michael Diamond eds., 
2011). 
71 Lucas, 505 U.S at 1006. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1006–09. 
74 Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). 
75 See id. at 1028. 
76 TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 21ST-CENTURY 
AMERICA 87 (2006) (emphasis in original). 
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compensating property owners,”77 such as by post-Lucas courts favoring 
less protective measures for property owners. Instead, courts should 
recognize that regulatory takings have, for the most part, occurred in the 
context of a post-World War II economy that was predominantly 
characterized by growth and that allowed for courts to more easily evaluate 
regulatory takings using “ad hoc, factual inquiries”78 rather than by 
developing concrete categorical rules. 
The regulation of property is but one component of a regulatory 
environment that “privileged unfettered risk and reward” and, accordingly, 
saw significant expansion in the decades following the Great Depression.79 
Despite the judiciary’s general acceptance of the limitations placed on 
property ownership by the growing regulatory state, “times of economic 
and social crises throw into stark relief perennial tensions in the discourse 
of property around the balance between the individual and community.”80 
Thus, America’s current economic crisis has implications for how we view 
the effect of regulation on property ownership. 
A. The Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Private Property 
In a society such as ours, founded on Lockean natural law principles,81 
property rights are respected, and property ownership is generally 
considered good for both individuals and society as a whole in that it 
creates profit incentives that motivate productive work and the emergence 
of creative processes that ultimately benefit society at large.82 In the current 
economic crisis, however, the accessibility of property ownership and the 
economic well-being that flows from it have become increasingly tenuous. 
The crisis has been characterized by widespread foreclosures and high 
levels of unemployment,83 and the separation of individuals from 
                                                                                                                           
 
77 Id. 
78 Lucas, 505 U.S at 1006 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978)). 
79 Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 70, at 65. 
80 Id. 
81 SANDEFUR, supra note 76, at 52–55. 
82 Id. at 36–37. 
83 Martin Neil Baily & Douglas J. Elliott, The US Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does It 
Stand and Where Do We Go From Here? 2 (June 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/ 
papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf. 
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significant assets, such as their homes or regular wages earned through 
employment opportunities, has had a negative effect on the well-being of 
both the affected individuals and society as a whole. Without a doubt, the 
effect of the crisis on property ownership has been so widespread that is has 
touched upon not only home ownership and wage-earning potential, but 
upon people’s retirement accounts, savings, and investments as well.84 
The economic crisis and the correlating widespread loss in various 
forms of property are troubling, and there is evidence that such loss 
contributed to the declining economic well-being of individuals. A recent 
study by the Rockefeller Foundation found that “[e]conomic insecurity is 
likely to have increased dramatically in the last few years” to the degree 
that “in 2009, the level of economic insecurity experienced by Americans 
was greater than at any time over the past quarter century, with 
approximately one in five Americans (20.4 percent) experiencing a decline 
in available household income of 25 percent or greater.”85 This widespread 
economic insecurity is in some ways facilitated by the lack of a “safety net 
of liquid financial wealth” for the majority of Americans over the past two 
decades.86 
B. The Economic Crisis Applied to the Circuit Split 
What is perhaps most troubling about the results in both Vandevere 
and Hoffman, viewing those cases in light of America’s growing economic 
insecurity, is the fact that the property interests claimed by the plaintiffs in 
both cases, and for which there was no compensation awarded, were 
perceived interests that arose in the course of employment. In Hoffman, the 
plaintiffs claimed an interest in seniority credits, statutorily extended to 
veterans, which would have augmented their salaries and other monetary 
benefits commensurate with employment,87 whereas in Vandevere, the 
plaintiffs claimed an interest in entry permits to fish in certain areas vital to 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 70, at 78. 
85 Jacob S. Hacker et al., Economic Security at Risk: Findings From the Economic Security Index 
11 (July 2010), http://www.economicsecurityindex.org/upload/media/Economic_Security_Index_Full_ 
Report.pdf. 
86 Id. at 16. 
87 See Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 612. 
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their economic livelihood as commercial fishers.88 In both cases, the 
continued existence of the property interest claimed presumably would 
have enhanced wage-earning potential. 
In an economic climate characterized by widespread unemployment, 
the loss of property interests tied to unemployment through regulatory 
action has the potential to have significant consequences for the economic 
security of those affected. Particularly striking in this context is the result in 
Vandevere. Where the government is able to regulate in a way that limits 
access to certain previously-perceived property interests (fishing permits) 
necessary to success in the course one’s employment (commercial fishing), 
the economic well-being of those employed in the regulated industry stands 
to be substantially diminished where compensation is denied. Moreover, as 
in Vandevere, where a regulatory structure exists with regard to one of the 
most important industries within the state at issue,89 it is fair to assume that 
individuals employed within that particular industry rely on the continued 
existence of that structure in shaping their employment choices. In an 
economic climate characterized by high unemployment and high levels of 
competitions for those employment opportunities that do exist, individuals 
who are negatively impacted by the imposition of noncompensable 
regulatory actions that substantially change a previously existing regulatory 
structure cannot necessarily easily recoup their losses through a simple 
career change. 
Notably, the negative consequences of regulation that affect the 
economic well-being of the individuals employed in a certain industry 
might be relevant in Takings Clause adjudications if those claiming a 
compensable loss were, in cases such as Vandevere, able to get past the 
threshold matter of whether they had a recognized property interest in the 
first place. As Hoffman makes clear, in regulatory takings litigation, a 
property owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations (in 
Vandevere, the pursuance of a commercial fishing career in reliance on the 
ability to acquire permits to fish in certain, lucrative waters) is a factor that 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 See Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 960. 
89 The official website of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game states that “[e]conomists have 
estimated the seafood industry to contribute $5.8 billion and 78,500 jobs to the Alaskan economy.” 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial Fisheries, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm? 
adfg=fishingcommercial.main (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
2012-2013] PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS 243 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.52 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
weighs heavily in the determination of whether the enactment of the 
challenged regulation warrants the payment of just compensation.90 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that where the deprivation imposed by 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, the 
court is more likely to find a compensable claim.91 
C. Society’s Economic Interest 
While the mechanical denial of just compensation where no property 
interest is found clearly has the potential to have an immediate impact on 
the claimant, there is a strong likelihood that, in the long run, the loss of 
various forms of property has a broader impact on the local economy in 
which the claimant is situated. Professor Joseph L. Sax explains that 
property interests are “tied to one another in complex ways, and property is 
more accurately described as being inextricably part of a network of 
relationships that is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property 
boundaries with which the legal system is accustomed to dealing.”92 Given 
this interconnectedness of property interests, property ownership is 
generally understood to be “an essential ingredient for economic growth 
and prosperity, for secure savings and intelligent investment and for the 
sophisticated transactions that raise the standard of living for everybody in 
society.”93 
The widespread nature of the economic crisis makes its “distributional 
consequences . . . difficult to ignore.”94 Using the ongoing foreclosure crisis 
as an example, Professors Nestor M. Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand 
state that “[w]e have always known that foreclosures, as devastating as they 
might be for an individual borrower in immediate terms, have an impact on 
others.”95 While this “spillover” was, in the past, “fairly localized,” the 
unprecedented rate of foreclosures in the past few years “has reached levels 
not seen since the Great Depression,” and, as a result, “entire communities 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 See Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 617. 
91 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
92 Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971). 
93 SANDEFUR, supra note 76, at 2. 
94 Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 70, at 78. 
95 Id. at 77. 
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are being devastated.”96 Professors Davidson and Dyal-Chand conclude 
that, “[i]n the light of crisis, the interdependence of the value of individual 
property holding becomes inescapable.”97 
The fragile state of the economy thus provides a compelling reason for 
the federal judicial system to fulfill what Professors Davidson and Dyal-
Chand call the state’s role in protecting “the integrity of market 
interactions” by moving to protect Takings Clause claimants from property 
loss that is not triggered by inevitable, unpredictable, and seemingly 
unstoppable market swings, but instead by governmental regulation. The 
economic crisis has demonstrated that property ownership is more tenuous 
now than at any time since the rise of the regulatory state. Home ownership 
seems out of reach for many, and there is no guarantee that high 
unemployment figures will not stagnate or possibly rise in the future as 
economic globalization continues. 
In view of the interconnection between individual economic well-
being and the strength of the broader economic system in which an 
individual is situated, individual property owners and American society 
alike simply cannot afford a judicial scheme that dismisses takings claims 
through deference to state or local laws that readily deny the existence of 
perceived property interests. Such deference and the resulting immediate 
dismissal of takings claims results in the failure of courts to adjudicate the 
heart of the matter and that which ultimately affects society’s economic 
well-being: whether an individual has experienced an unconstitutional 
economic loss as a result of a taking. 
An evaluation of takings claims that is more permissive toward state 
law, as exemplified in Vandevere, may have been acceptable in decades 
past when America’s economy was more prosperous. During periods of 
economic growth, regulations that denied the existence of property interests 
were perhaps viewed with less skepticism than they should be viewed now. 
Conversely, the current economic state shows the detrimental effect of 
regulation. As a result, a court’s evaluation of when a regulatory taking has 
occurred should be modified to establish an analytical scheme for takings 
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claims that does not exasperate the economic downturns that are inevitable 
in a free market economy. 
D. Protecting the Economy Through the Application of Federal Law in 
Takings Litigation 
In America’s new economic reality, state or local regulations that 
interfere with property rights should be more restrained, or at the very least, 
the adjudication of takings claims should more frequently result in the 
provision of just compensation where perceived property interests are at 
stake. Certainly stare decisis, predicated upon decades of takings 
jurisprudence, demands that the federal framework for claims arising as a 
result of regulatory enactments be left mostly intact. Today’s economy, 
however, provides a compelling reason beyond the relevant Supreme Court 
precedent set forth in Section IV above for the adoption of the First 
Circuit’s federal definition of private property. This framework would 
provide greater protection for property owners, while at the same time 
modifying existing takings jurisprudence in only a subtle way. 
The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the First Circuit’s Hoffman 
approach would result in the establishment of a minimum, non-ad hoc 
standard for what constitutes private property. In adopting the First 
Circuit’s analytical model across the federal system, courts would adopt a 
specific “federal constitutional definition of private property” and then 
consistently apply that standard definition when looking at state or local 
law to determine whether any private property interest had been created.98 
The practical consequence of the adoption of a federal definition would be 
greater protection for takings claimants where state or local laws 
manipulated the existence of property interest, a risk alluded to by the 
Supreme Court in Palazzolo,99 possibly at the behest of powerful interest 
groups engaged in rent-seeking behavior.100 The adoption of a federal 
standard, in effect, would allow plaintiffs claiming a loss of property as a 
result of a regulatory taking to have their claim subject to more substantive 
                                                                                                                           
 
98 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 63. 
99 See 533 U.S. at 627. 
100 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 64. 
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judicial analysis by removing obstacles in meeting the threshold element of 
a compensable claim. 
It is true that regulatory takings make for difficult cases, and that 
“[c]ase-by-case adjudication is inevitable in an area where bright lines are 
impossible and courts are forced to review an infinite variety of state 
regulatory actions.”101 In this area of the law, courts are required to engage 
in “imprecise balancing” as they “consider the complex impacts of a 
regulation on property rights, as well as the complex political and policy 
decisions a government agency made in imposing that regulation.”102 At the 
same time, consistent application of federal law in the threshold element of 
a takings claim would bring greater predictability to at least one element of 
takings litigation, thus embracing the Supreme Court’s recognition in Lucas 
of “the desirability of finding a way to make takings law less ‘ad hoc.’”103 
Reliance on federal law in defining private property is well-grounded 
in a popular rationale underlying the Fifth Amendment’s compensation 
requirement: the idea of basic fairness in the government’s treatment of its 
citizens.104 The Supreme Court famously encapsulated this rationale in 
Armstrong v. United States,105 where it explained that “[t]he Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public 
use without just compensation was designed to bar [g]overnment from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”106 Even though this 
“equal treatment rationale is relatively straightforward” in eminent domain 
cases, Professors Dana and Merrill note that beyond these types of cases, “it 
becomes more difficult to say when fairness and justice require 
compensation in order to preserve the principle of equal treatment.”107 
In the context of today’s poor economic climate, however, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that courts should employ a broader perspective as to 
                                                                                                                           
 
101 Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 
529 (2009). 
102 Id. 
103 Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, in REGULATORY TAKINGS: 
RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 54 (Roger Clegg ed., 1994). 
104 Id. at 33–34. 
105 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
106 Id. at 49. 
107 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
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when regulatory takings result in unequal treatment. In a time of slow 
economic growth and poor job prospects, it seems readily apparent that 
citizens have much more at stake when the government takes any perceived 
property interest, be it real or personal property or more tangential interests, 
thus leading to possible divergence from the equal treatment principle when 
just compensation is not awarded. Whether the taking at issue is a routine 
exercise of eminent domain or a more complex regulatory taking, the same 
rationale for providing just compensation should inform the way in which 
courts determine the property interest at stake. 
VI. A FEDERAL DEFINITION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ITS EFFECT ON 
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
While beyond the scope of this note, establishing the precise 
components of a federal definition of private property is a key aspect in 
moving beyond the current circuit split and toward a workable standard for 
future takings litigation in the federal system. Accordingly, I pause to offer 
the reader some insight into what that federal definition might look like, as 
informed by the scholarship of Professors Dana and Merrill, who have 
discerned “two elements of a federal definition that are implicitly supported 
by the general run of decided cases and explicitly recognized in Supreme 
Court decisions.”108 These two elements are what Dana and Merrill describe 
as “discrete assets” and the “right to exclude.”109 
First, under the “discrete assets” element, private property refers to 
some tangible “thing,” and excludes from consideration more intangible 
property interests such as “bodily security, or personal privacy, or general 
shares of wealth, or a particular distribution of income.”110 This element of 
private property finds support in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,111 in which 
the Court held that a federal statute that required coal companies to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 68. In addition to the two elements described, Dana and 
Merrill also recommend a third element, the characterization of the property at issue as “exchangeable 
on a stand-alone basis” as an important component of making a federal definition of private property 
more complete and less broad. I exclude discussion of this third element because, as Dana and Merrill 
admit, there is “little explicit authority for such a requirement” within the existing case law. Id. at 77. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 68–69. 
111 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
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lifetime health benefits for both retirees and their families was 
unconstitutional, not on the basis of the Takings Clause, but instead, under 
the Due Process Clause.112 According to Dana and Merrill, in rejecting 
application of the Takings Clause where a law imposes “only a general 
financial liability,”113 the Court implicitly confirmed the notion that private 
property must constitute a “discrete asset.” 
Second, under the “right to exclude” element, “the person who is 
identified as the owner of the property interest at issue has “the general 
power to exclude trespasses and other unwanted incursions by a large and 
indefinite class of others.”114 In support of this element, Dana and Merrill 
cite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,115 
describing the right to exclude others as “fundamental element of the 
property right”116 and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,117 
explaining that “[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been considered 
one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property 
rights.”118 
While establishing a federal definition of private property would 
enhance private property ownership by giving teeth to the threshold inquiry 
in takings litigation, such a significant change in this area of jurisprudence 
would also, admittedly, open the door to critique. The establishment of a 
federal definition, however, is practical in its relative moderation. A federal 
definition would provide greater protection for property owners without 
going as far as property absolutists who “contend the police power may not 
extend to any ‘use’ of property” and that “any governmental action 
affecting a person’s use of property, in any fashion, constitutes a taking 
entitling that person to compensation.”119 These proponents of unfettered 
property ownership “deny the importance of the police power as a 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 Id. at 545–47. 
113 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 70 (citing Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
114 Id. at 73. 
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116 Id. at 179–80. 
117 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
118 Id. at 435. 
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Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2000). 
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fundamental attribute of the government in the regulation of property.”120 In 
contrast, the federalization of the inquiry into the existence of a property 
interest clearly envisions the continued adjudication of takings claims, thus 
recognizing the occasional necessity of state regulation of private 
property—such as to address “known conservation problems,” as in 
Vandevere,121 or to change state employment policies to address 
administrative issues arising in conjunction with the operation of a certain 
statute, as in Hoffman.122 
Furthermore, reliance on federal law would add protection for property 
owners with respect to only one of the four elemental requirements of 
compensable takings claim; thus guarding against what Justice Stevens 
warned of in his dissent in Lucas, namely, the establishment of categorical 
rules that “hamper the efforts of local officials and planners” who deal with 
“increasingly complex problems” in matters typically subject to 
regulation.123 Establishing a more categorical approach in favor of greater 
protection for property owners with respect to but one of four elements 
certainly does not transform takings jurisprudence so substantially as to 
abrogate the effective execution of a state’s police power in response to 
those state-specific issues that require redress. Even if this move toward a 
categorical rule for one of the elements of a claim in some way constitutes a 
more categorical approach in takings litigation overall, it is questionable 
whether Justice Stevens’ fear has ever materialized. The Court’s decisions 
in such cases as Kelo v. City of New London124 and Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc.,125 both decided more than a decade after Lucas, demonstrate 
                                                                                                                           
 
120 Id. at 861. In Takings Clause scholarship, this is the classic libertarian view advanced by 
Professor Richard A. Epstein, who argued that virtually any governmental regulation resulting from 
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requiring the payment of just compensation whenever a person experiences a decline in property values 
. . . unless it can be shown that implicit compensation has been provided or the police power exception 
applies.” Accordingly, “[t]he state could no longer be used as an instrument for wealth redistribution.” 
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 1, at 50. 
121 644 F.3d at 962. 
122 909 F.2d at 611. 
123 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
124 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
125 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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that government actions that conflict with property interests continue to be 
upheld even against charges of government overreaching.126 
Nor does the use of a federal definition of private property 
automatically transform questionable property interests into existence. As 
demonstrated by the First Circuit’s decision in Hoffman, using a federal 
standard to determine the existence of a property interest does not 
necessitate a win for property owners in all takings claims. Besides the 
absence of a contractual right to enhanced seniority benefits, the property 
interest claimed by the plaintiffs in Hoffman, the court also found that 
various significant factors in takings claims, as laid out by prior Supreme 
Court case law, were absent such that the repeal of the statute granting the 
seniority benefits in the first place did not constitute a compensable 
taking.127 Even if the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere had analyzed the existence 
of the plaintiff’s property interest using a federal standard, there is no 
guarantee that the court would have declared the existence of a property 
interest. In Vanek v. State,128 a case similar to and preceding Vandevere, the 
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s ruling that entry permits 
issued to commercial salmon fishers did not constitute property under the 
federal Constitution.129 The Alaska Supreme Court relied on prior federal 
case law addressing takings claims with respect to regulation of the fishing 
industry for its determination that commercial fishers “[do] not suffer the 
taking of a property interest legally cognizable under the Fifth Amendment 
when previously issued permits [are] revoked through special legislation 
and regulations.130 
                                                                                                                           
 
126 James B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and Public 
Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 613 (2007). 
127 Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 617. The Court focused particularly on “(1) the economic impact of the 
[statute] on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the [statute] has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.” Id. 
128 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008). 
129 Vanek, 193 P.3d at 292 (citing Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
130 Id. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
While the question of whether state or federal law defines the property 
interest claimed in takings litigation remains an unresolved matter in federal 
courts, both relevant Supreme Court case law and the vulnerability of the 
nation’s economic health where takings claims are overly deferential to 
state law recommend the resolution of the recent circuit split on this issue in 
favor of federal law. The primacy of federal law with respect to this issue 
strikes an essential balance between allowing for the continuation of 
takings—recognizing that they are essential to the state police power—
while at the same time adding protective measures for both property owners 
and society at large, who are more economically vulnerable today than at 
any time since the rise of the regulatory state. 
